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When ordinary Americans think of New Zealand (which is hardly at all),
they probably envision the breathtaking mountains, glaciers, and lakes pano-
ramically depicted in the film version of Lord of the Rings. For legal scholars,
however, radical tort reform distinguishes New Zealand's approach to accident
law from that of the United States (and indeed of all other jurisdictions). Not
that tort reform has been lacking in the United States. In recent years, most
states have enacted important changes, almost always to reduce tort liability:
caps on pain-and-suffering, a revised collateral source rule, limits on punitive
damages and joint liability, and protections for physicians facing malpractice
claims, among many others. Federal tort reform has focused on class actions,
firearms litigation, preemption, childhood vaccines, general aviation, FDA-
regulated drug litigation, and other areas.
To American lawyers, such changes seem very far-reaching. But viewed
from New Zealand, even Texas's robust version of tort reform, which has trans-
formed the state into a much more defendant-friendly jurisdiction, looks like a
mere rearrangement of the deck chairs on the Titanic. New Zealand, after all,
abolished the most important areas of tort law more than three decades ago,
and its people seem quite happy with the result.' In stark contrast, the American
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1. Indeed, according to Sir Geoffrey Palmer, who (prior to becoming Prime Minis-
ter) drafted a 1969 White Paper on accident compensation, favorable public opin-
ion protected it from some proposed changes even as early as 1981-82. Geoffrey
Palmer, The New Zealand Experience, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 604, 608 (1993). See gen-
erally IAN CAMPBELL, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW ZEALAND
(1996) (tracing the history of the New Zealand system). More recently, the oppo-
sition National Party has advocated privatizing the insurance part of the scheme,
but has not proposed returning to the tort system. E-mail from Geoff McLay,
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tort system continues to expand and flourish, while representing (depending on
whom one asks) either the essence of popular justice or a symbol of all that is
wrong with our law. Even recognizing the many important differences between
these two common law jurisdictions, the New Zealand experience with tort re-
form nevertheless highlights one striking feature of American tort law: the re-
markable durability of our tort system in the face of persistent and growing
criticism from many academic commentators,2 business groups,3 and political
leaders. 4 But the United States is hardly distinctive in the durability of its tort
law; the same is true of the other British Commonwealth countries, including,
most notably, "neighboring" Australia, which specifically considered the New
Zealand approach but did not adopt it.
I. TORT REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND
Early in the twentieth century, New Zealand adopted a national no-fault
workers' compensation scheme, replacing tort law for industrial accidents while
leaving the rest of the system intact. It also mandated tort liability insurance
against auto accidents.' During the 196os, New Zealand established a royal
commission to explore possible reforms to its workers' compensation system.
As often occurs with such bodies-including our own constitutional conven-
tion in 1787-the commission decided not to be limited by its remit but pro-
ceeded, instead, to review the tort system more generally.
In 1967, the commission published the Woodhouse Report (as it is popu-
larly known).6 It severely criticized the fault-based tort system's "false moral-
ity," unpredictable damage awards, and high transaction costs. Transaction
Reader in Law, Vict. Univ. at Wellington (June 16, 20o8) (on file with the Yale
Law & Policy Review).
2. See, e.g., JEFFREY O'CONNELL & CHRISTOPHER J. ROBINETTE, A RECIPE FOR BAL-
ANCED TORT REFORM 29-49 (20o8).
3. See, e.g., COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., RESEARCH AND POL'Y COMM., WHO SHOULD BE
LIABLE?: A GUIDE TO POLICY FOR DEALING WITH RISK (1989); Press Release, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Marks House 'Tort Reform Week' by Urging
Swift Passage of the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act (Sept. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2004/september/04-122.htm; Press Re-
lease, The Business Roundtable, White House Study Reveals Tort System's Harm
to America's Workers and Consumers (Apr. 29, 2002) (on file with the Yale Law &
Policy Review).
4- COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS?: AN Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM (2002), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/cea/tortliabilitysystem _apro2.pdf.
5. The American states enacted these changes (and the courts upheld them) a decade
or two later.
6. Joan M. Matheson, Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: The Wood-
house Report, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 191,191-95 (1969).
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costs were estimated to comprise over 40% of the system's total costs,7 a lower
figure than the comparable costs of U.S. asbestos litigation first launched
around the same time.' In place of tort, the Woodhouse Report proposed ex-
tending the no-fault compensation scheme from workplace accidents to per-
sonal injuries generally. The document expressed hope that this system would
provide wage-loss benefits roughly matching pre-injury earnings and additional
benefits for permanent bodily impairment, while also promoting accident pre-
vention, victim rehabilitation, and administrative efficiency.
In 1972, the National Party government, whose Justice and Labour minis-
tries had actively promoted the commission's work and the Woodhouse Report,
pushed through the Accident Compensation Act.9 It enjoyed bipartisan support
and passed quite easily, a fact that will astonish any American lawyer observing
the protracted, titanic struggles over even the mildest tort reforms in the United
States. Amended in 1973 by the new Labour government to include accidents to
non-wage earners, the Act went into effect in April 1974. 'o
Even more surprising, the public did not demand the new system. Instead,
it was the handiwork of a small group of dedicated reformers led by influential
and prestigious judges." Success was assured when the major groups opposing
the reform-the insurance industry, the bar, and labor unions-turned out to
be politically weak and fragmented."2 However, the new system was not the
comprehensive abolition of tort that the Woodhouse Report had proposed.
Rather, it limited no-fault coverage to motor vehicle-related injuries and to
wage earners' injuries, regardless of whether the injuries were work-related. But
the government subsequently expanded the system to cover virtually all acci-
dental injuries and to confer very broad benefits on victims. New Zealanders
today generally regard their system (some disputed details aside, some of which
are listed at the end of Part II) as a mainstay of their social policy.3
7. GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SO-
CIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 27 (1979).
8. RICHARD H. GASKINs, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS: PERSONAL INJURY AND PUB-
LIC RESPONSIBILITY 305-06 (1989).
9. See Palmer, supra note I, at 612-13.
1O. The legislative history is detailed in GASKINS, supra note 8, at 325-50.
11. PALMER, supra note 7, at 69.
12. Id. at 115-30.
13. ACCIDENT COMP. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 5 (Sept. 2007) (on file with the
Yale Law & Policy Review) (comments from the Interim Chair of the ACC Board,
Brenda Tahi).
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II. THE FACE OF RADICAL TORT REFORM
The heart of the New Zealand system, in existence for more than thirty
years, is a blanket prohibition on almost all personal injury damage actions.14 A
government agency, the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), operates
the scheme as a Crown entity. Although a National Party government briefly
privatized the insurance function for workplace accidents in 1998, the Labour
government soon returned to power and swiftly restored the ACC as New Zea-
land's sole insurer for such accidents.
The ACC provides generous no-fault benefits, including hospital and
medical costs; wage replacement, starting only one week after injury, at a rate of
80% of average weekly earnings; rehabilitation and transportation costs; lump
sum payments for permanent loss or impairment; and entitlements for surviv-
ing spouses and children. Most medical and dental services do not require pre-
approval, and service providers, not consumers, complete paperwork for the
ACC.
The ACC's benefit payments come from six different accounts; each corre-
sponds to a category of victim and accident types, and each is funded separately
by targeted levies or general revenues. 5 To simplify somewhat, these accounts
cover injuries from motor vehicle accidents on public roads, work-related inju-
ries to employees and self-employed people, workers injured outside the work-
place, work-related injuries suffered before 1999, medical treatment injuries,
and injuries to those who are not in the active labor force (mostly children and
the elderly).6
In fiscal year 2006-2007, the ACC had 1.6 million claims pending. The bulk
of these was solely for medical treatment reimbursement covering a population
of 4.3 million, approximately 1.75% of the U.S. population.1 7 In fiscal year 2005-
2006, the ACC paid out NZ$569 million on new claims and NZ$9 64 million on
preexisting claims. Claim denials, which can be appealed, are rare (1-3%) for
most of these accounts, but occur in 15% of work-related accidents to employ-
ees, and 36.5% of medical treatment injuries.
14. Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001, 2001 S.N.Z. No.
49 [hereinafter IPRCA].
15. About ACC, http://www.acc.co.nz/about-acc/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
16. Id.
17. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION NEW
ZEALAND: SCHEME REVIEW iii (2008) [hereinafter SCHEME REvIEw]. Although
comparisons are of little value here, the number of new tort filings in the United
States that year can be estimated roughly at 615,000 for the state courts alone. See
NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TORT CASELOADS IN STATE TRIAL COURTS OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION, 1996-2005, http://www.ncsconline.org/D-Research/csp/
2oo6_files/Table%2o4.o5.xls (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). If tort filings in the federal
courts are less than lo% of total civil filings, as has been estimated, this would
produce a total of roughly 675,000 new tort cases in all courts.
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Although the ACC scheme prohibits almost all personal injury actions for
damages, it does permit some exceptions, including actions for intentionally or
negligently causing property damage, for malicious prosecution or conspiracy
"so long as plaintiff seeks recovery for damages other than those produced by
'injury by accident,"' for some mental injuries not due to personal injury, and
for exemplary damages. 8
A comprehensive account of the New Zealand accident compensation
scheme is beyond the scope of this Essay.'9 Nevertheless, one can glimpse how
the ACC system operates by considering several important categories of acci-
dent-related claims that are often handled through the tort system in the United
States. I shall briefly discuss two of these categories: medical treatment injuries
and emotional harm claims.
A. Medical Treatment Injuries
American tort reform has been driven partly by concerns about how medi-
cal malpractice law affects the remedies available to victims, the availability and
cost of insurance for providers, the practice of defensive medicine, and rising
health care costs.2" With many of the same concerns in mind, New Zealand has
struggled from the beginning to fit medical injuries into the ACC's overall
compensation scheme. This road has not been smooth, as it soon became clear
that the no-fault system would treat medical injuries differently-and more re-
strictively-than other compensable injuries, largely because of the govern-
ment's desire to exclude illness from ACC coverage.2'
A recently-published comparative study of medical malpractice compensa-
tion summarizes New Zealand's experience. It is worth quoting at length:
Initially, all accidental personal injuries were covered, including medi-
cal malpractice, which was labeled "medical misadventure." However,
total expenditures from the program rose rapidly.
... The funding changed dramatically over the course of three dec-
ades and several reforms; a pay-as-you-go financing structure was es-
tablished, a new levy for registered health professionals was created
.... Also, the government retained the power to require risk-rated
premiums for health professionals. Administrative cost, however, was
only lo percent of total expense. Even so, the overall costs of New Zea-
18. Richard S. Miller, The Future of New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, 11
U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 36 (1989). See also IPRCA, supra note 14, §§ 317, 319.
19. For such an account, see SCHEME REVIEW, supra note 17.
20. See, e.g., FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 301
(2oo8).
21. This exclusion is apparently universal in current medical no-fault systems. Ac-
cording to the SCHEME REVIEW, the Netherlands covers all incapacity, including
illness and sickness, but only for employees under its workers' compensation
scheme. SCHEME REVIEW, supra note 17, at xi.
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land's no-fault program have proven to be burdensome. Cost per claim
has risen considerably.
In response to rising costs, there was a major reform in 1992 which
substantially restricted the scope of covered injuries, shortened the
time within which claims could be brought, and eliminated lump sum
payments for pain and suffering. As in Sweden, the New Zealand pro-
gram now required a fourteen-day hospital stay or twenty-eight sick
days as a requirement for eligibility. The newly restricted definition of
medical misadventure introduced an element of fault, limiting claims
to injuries resulting from medical error or mishap, and thus removing
the problem of having to distinguish between injuries resulting from
medical care and unavoidable or inevitable injuries. The introduction
of fault in the 199os was not a surprise; courts had used fault in their
analyses of medical misadventures throughout the 198os, and a sub-
stantial body of case law had developed.2
Medical "error" closely resembled the American negligence standard, while
"mishap" employed the no-fault criteria of rarity (defined as occurring in no
more than 1% of cases) and severity (defined as certain periods of hospitaliza-
tion, extended disability, or death) of the adverse consequence of treatment. 3
Another recent comparative study, discussed below, notes that New Zealand
provided compensation under the "mishap" standard for acts that met the rar-
ity and severity criteria, but not for omissions that satisfied the criteria (unless
the omission qualified as medical "error").2 4 Other boundary problems, the au-
thors found, plagued this no-fault "mishap" standard:
Determining whether complications fell beneath the 1 percent thresh-
old proved difficult in practice, often because of gaps in epidemiologic
data. Moreover, decisionmakers soon realized that the threshold may
be a moving target in medicine. A new type of prosthesis, for example,
may initially be regarded as very safe, but with time and broader use,
data may reveal a complication rate of greater than i percent. The pe-
culiar result would be that an early cohort of claims would be com-
pensable under the mishap rule, whereas later claims would miss out.
Practical difficulties also emerged in applying the severity criteria.
While death and hospitalization periods were relatively easy to meas-
22. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 20, at 301-02 (footnotes omitted). This passage ap-
plies to the medical portion of the scheme, except for the administrative cost fig-
ure and some of the 1992 reforms, which are for the scheme as a whole. See E-mail
from Lindsey Chepke, Research Assoc., Duke Univ. (Mar. 28, 20o8) (on file with
the Yale Law & Policy Review).
23. Allen B. Kachalia et al., Beyond Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Com-
pensation, 66 Soc. Sci. & MED. 387, 394 (20o8).
24. Id. at 399.
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ure, "severe disability," which can be a highly subjective notion, left
considerable room for interpretation.25
When the New Zealand parliament narrowed the scope of "medical misad-
ventures" in 1992 to introduce a fault element, it used these same criteria. 6 Such
claims were themselves rare (0.14% of the total claims filed with the ACC), al-
though the average size of each medical claim was far larger than that of other
claims.2 7
New Zealanders complained that the stringency of these "rare" and "se-
vere" tests effectively rendered medical treatment-related injuries the only kind
of accident not fully covered by the ACC. These complaints resonated politi-
cally because New Zealand, like the United States, lacks national health insur-
ance. Relatively few employers in New Zealand offer private health insurance, in
contrast to practices in the United States, where such insurance is very wide-
spread (though perhaps less so than at times in the past)." Instead, New Zea-
land maintains a system of tax-funded public health clinics and hospitals that
provide free care but that, like all such systems, also have long waiting lists, par-
ticularly for social services such as rehabilitation and long-term care. Under the
ACC scheme, a child disabled by medical treatment at birth would receive ex-
tensive social services benefits, even full-time attendant care, while a baby born
with Down syndrome would receive only the limited public benefits available
through the public health system. 9
As a result of such anomalies, there is constant public pressure to expand
ACC coverage to include not only "accidents" but also "illnesses" and other
misfortunes. Not surprisingly, this line has proved hard to justify and to main-
tain, particularly in a country that has long viewed no-fault compensation for
physical injuries as a basic social entitlement. Absent national health insurance,
this pressure has focused on efforts to further enlarge ACC coverage and bene-
fits. Since the ACC provides not only more benefits but also faster access to
those benefits, especially medical treatment, these efforts have been intense.3"
25. Id.
26. Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992, 1992 S.N.Z. No.
13, § 5.
27. Ken Oliphant, Beyond Misadventure: Compensation for Medical Injuries in New
Zealand, 15 MED. L. REV. 357, 365 (2007).
28. See Ian Urbina, A Decline in Uninsured Is Reported for 2007, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2008, at A14.
29. Interview with John Miller, Barrister and Solicitor, in Wellington, N.Z. (Feb. 5,
2008).
30. On the other hand, recourse to the tort system remains an attractive option for
certain victims who suffer medical accidents that are not covered by the ACC but
in which plaintiffs can readily prove fault. This fact has caused at least one com-
mentator to propose a split system in which a patient could choose between filing
a no-fault claim to the ACC and pursuing a tort claim. See Petra Butler, A Brief In-
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In response, the Labour Party government enacted important changes in
2005 that, among other amendments, substituted for "medical misadventure" a
new and supposedly broader coverage category: "treatment injury."3' This cate-
gory was designed to liberalize the coverage standard for medical injuries by
distinguishing treatment-related accidents from (1) the question of fault, which
legislators wished to make irrelevant to compensation and (2) the natural pro-
gression of disease, for which compensation had never been intended. Although
this change seems likely to open the door to greater coverage-indeed, that is
the government's intent-it still necessitates some very fine line-drawing. This
combination of liberality and ambiguity probably explains why medical treat-
ment claims nearly tripled in the first year, while the ACC's denial rate for such
claims declined by half (from 71% to 36%).3' Expenditures increased almost 28%
in the first year after the change.33 The government plans to evaluate the cost,
implementation, and effects of these changes in 2010. Some officials believe that
the increased number of claims will be fiscally manageable, although the costs
of covered health care and allied services are rising rapidly.
34
Reportedly, medical patients who suffer adverse outcomes increasingly seek
exemplary damages through tort actions in addition to their ACC benefits." To
do so, they must show that the defendant acted either with harmful intention or
reckless intent, or, where the exemplary damages are based on the defendant's
negligence, that the negligence was truly exceptional or outrageous.36 Exemplary
damages, when awarded, are low by American standards, and they almost never
are awarded in medical injury cases.
3 7
troduction to Medical Misadventure, 35 VIcr. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 811, 819
(2004).
31. Oliphant, supra note 27, at 357.
32. Id. at 385.
33. Id.
34. Interview with Graeme Buchanan, Deputy Sec'y of Labour, N.Z. Dep't of Labour,
and Staff, in Wellington, N.Z. (Feb. 5, 2008).
35. Butler, supra note 30, at 816-17.
36. Interview with John Miller, supra note 29.
37. According to John Miller, NZ$30,000 may be awarded for sexual abuse, and
NZsxoo,ooo is the highest he can recall. Id. If the defendant already has been pun-
ished criminally, this fact may be considered in limiting the exemplary damages.
See IPRCA § 319(3). In Bottrill v. A, a woman whose cancer was misdiagnosed by a
pathologist received ACC benefits and sued for exemplary damages, but she was
denied them by the Court of Appeal on the ground that such damages could only
be awarded where a doctor "acts deliberately or recklessly" to put a patient at risk.
[2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 622, 636 (C.A.), rev'd, [20031 2 N.Z.L.R. 721 (P.C.). The Privy
Council reversed on the ground that his fault went far beyond simple negligence.
Bottrill v. A, [2003] 2 N.ZL.R. 721, 729 (P.C.) ("There may be the rare case where
the defendant departed so far and so flagrantly from the dictates of ordinary or
professional precepts of prudence, or standards of care, that his conduct satisfies
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The New Zealand system's handling of medical accident claims reveals sev-
eral other significant features. As the account excerpted above describes:
In addition to monetary compensation, claimants in New Zealand
have the option of pursuing nonmonetary remedies. In 1994, the New
Zealand Parliament created ... the Health and Disability Commission
(HDC). The HDC is also responsible for handling disciplinary com-
plaints. However, the most common form of non-monetary relief
sought from the HDC is not disciplinary action; rather, it is a request
for corrective measures to address the cause of harm.
Error reporting in New Zealand is a regular part of the medical
culture; acknowledgment of injuries in patient records is extremely
high. Truthful, consistent error reporting provides opportunities to
evaluate quality of care problems, a sharp contrast with the United
States, where such reporting is rare?
Two other notable features are the speed with which the compensation is
delivered (i.e., the ACC must notify claimants of its decision within nine
months) and the emphasis on accountability to complaining patients through
an explanation of what happened, an apology by the provider, or an assurance
of a system change to improve patient safety in the future.39 Nevertheless, many
New Zealand physicians fault the system:
Nearly 40 percent did not think most complaints were warranted, and
another 33 percent did not believe complainants were normal people.
In addition, the complaint and disciplinary system is nicknamed
"death by iooo arrows" by some... due to its complexity. Some view
this complexity as standing in the way of New Zealand's no-fault pro-
grams' accessibility, efficiency, and effectiveness. Also, New Zealand's
no-fault system may lack incentives to improve patient safety, given its
broad funding base and lack of experience rating.
4 °
A new study by American medical researchers (briefly discussed and ex-
cerpted earlier) compares the medical injury compensation schemes of New
this test even though he was not consciously reckless."). According to Professor
Geoff McLay, an expert on ACC law, the Bottrill case is exceptional and may in-
deed be the only example of exemplary damages in a medical injury case. He also
notes that, under New Zealand law, claims for exemplary damages die with the
victim. E-mail from Geoff McLay, supra note 1.
38. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 2o, at 302 (footnotes omitted). Reporting is rare not
only in the United States. According to a recent comparative study, Sweden and
Denmark, unlike New Zealand, have erected "a Chinese wall between compensa-
tion and disciplinary activities." Kachalia et al., supra note 23, at 391. Recently, and
controversially, the HDC has encouraged local health boards to publish provider
ratings indicating their medical error rates. See Ruth Hill, Push on DHB Reporting
Will 'Lead to Less Safety', DOMINION POST (N.Z.), Mar. 19, 2o08, at 16.
39. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 20, at 302.
40. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Zealand, Sweden, and Denmark using interviews with administrators and
stakeholders in the three systems. 4' While New Zealand's system purports to be
strictly no-fault (according to the authors, it covers any "injury that is not a
'necessary and ordinary' consequence of treatment"), 42 the two Nordic coun-
tries use an "avoidability" standard, defined as an injury that would not have
occurred in the hands of an experienced, or the best, specialist in the relevant
field. According to the authors, "avoidability" denotes a higher standard of care
(excellent) than the customary standard used in malpractice law (merely ac-
ceptable), although it does not go so far as to impose strict liability. They con-
clude that applying the "avoidability" standard has proved to be feasible.
B. Emotional Harm Claims
American tort law has experienced some difficulty in dealing coherently
and predictably with claims of negligently-inflicted emotional harm. Skepticism
about the authenticity and proof of such claims competes with a growing social
and legal consensus that physical injury often leads to emotional injury and that
the distinction between them is artificial, stigmatizing, and otherwise objection-
able. 43 Courts, however, seem confident that juries can critically assess expert
testimony about psychological phenomena. For decades, however, American
courts have also continued to evince some skepticism and have devised legal
doctrines that they think will more effectively separate meritorious claims from
spurious ones. Such doctrines include a few notoriously arbitrary tests, includ-
ing impact, zone of danger, and bystander reactions."
New Zealand's no-fault system likewise has struggled to deal with emo-
tional harm claims in an effort to contain the potential costs of fully recognizing
them. The ACC covered such claims until the late 1990s but then barred them;
it now covers only mental injury of a serious nature caused by either a covered
physical injury or a specified sex crime. Critics of this limitation argue that it,
too, is arbitrary, justified only by the desire to draw a line that excludes most
emotional harm claims.
45
41. Kachalia et al., supra note 23, at 391. This study was conducted in 2005, presuma-
bly before the "treatment injury" standard (newly established that year) was put
into full operation. Id. at 392.
42. Id. at 394.
43. Forty-two states, both houses of Congress, and some other countries have passed
some version of parity legislation. Sarah Kershaw, The Murky Politics of Mind-
Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, Week in Review, at 1.
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). In New Zealand, the court applied
similar limitations in Van Soest v. Residual Health Mgmt. Unit, [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R.
179 (C.A.).
45. Interview with John Miller, supra note 29.
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Two pending court cases illustrate the difficulty of line-drawing in mental
injury claims. In one, a claimant was prosecuted for failing to tell his sexual
partner that he was HIV-positive. 46 If this failure constituted "indecent assault"
(a sex crime), the ACC would pay for her psychiatric costs; if, instead, it was a
criminal nuisance (arguably not a sex crime), then the ACC would not.47 In an-
other case, a woman was manhandled by robbers (wrenching her shoulder) and
then suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 4' The ACC denied her
claim, asserting that it was the fright, not the shoulder wrench, that caused her
PTSD. 49 In such cases, the judgments that are required in order for the deci-
sionmaker to apply the applicable legal standard ("of a serious nature caused
by") are inevitably subjective, if not arbitrary.
Not surprisingly, the ACC's very limited coverage of mental injury claims
has motivated victims to bring them as common law tort claims, which the
courts so far have generally rejected.5" Recent legislation extended coverage but
only for diagnosed mental injury experienced by employees for sudden trau-
matic events in the workplace.5
C. Other Compensation Policy Issues
Many other modifications to the New Zealand system were enacted in
200852 or remain under debate, but the scope of this Essay does not allow an
adequate discussion of them. These would improve the ACC's administrative
efficiency; privatize the scheme's insurance component; improve rehabilitation
of the disabled; refine "experience rating" so that it more closely reflects actual
risk and cost creation; enhance prevention incentives; cover more occupational
diseases; clarify the status of so-called "wrongful birth" claims; deal with highly
risky victim behaviors, including suicide; deal with mental illness; make "earn-
ings" calculations fairer for non-standard work; clarify what constitutes "suit-
able work" that disabled persons must accept lest they lose benefits; determine
when to allow lump sum benefits; clarify the standards for exemplary damages
claims; and reform the "actual earnings" basis for work-related compensation
46. CLM v. Accident Comp. Corp., [20o6] 3 N.Z.L.R. 127 (H.C.).
47. Id.
48. Woodd v. Accident Comp. Corp. (District Court, Wellington, Al 288/02854/03,
Apr. 2, 2003, Cadenhead, J.).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., JD v. Ross, [1998] N.Z.F.L.R. 951 (H.C.); Wiggins v. R, [1998] D.C.R. 204
(D.C.).
51. See Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Act 2008
§ 6, available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2oo8/oo46/latest/DLM
nio6388.html.
52. See id.
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for low-wage workers. There are also, of course, perennial calls for higher (or
lower) benefit levels and levies.
III. BACK TO TORT LAW IN AMERICA: LESSONS FROM NEW ZEALAND?
New Zealand's experience without (much) tort law-particularly this very
brief review of how its system handles treatment injuries and emotional harm
claims-yields some general lessons beyond the obvious one that politics ulti-
mately determines the shape of reform.
A. Different Strokes for Different Folks
New Zealand's experiment with minimal tort law reminds us that other
modern liberal democracies pursue roughly similar social goals through pro-
grams that are quite different from our own, yet these countries can implement
their programs in ways that manage to earn public legitimacy. Although costs
are rising and many elements may need adjustment, New Zealand's compensa-
tion system remains quite popular after more than three decades."
B. Tort Law Will Endure, Even Under a No-Fault Standard
So long as any categorical boundaries between no-fault and tort exist-the
examples of medical treatment injuries and emotional harm claims pose per-
haps the most difficult boundary problems 4-claimants and their lawyers will
always face strong incentives to prosecute claims in whatever remains of the tort
system, litigating the precise contours of these legal boundaries, i.e., of no-fault
coverage or its exceptions. Litigation will ensue at least where the underlying
fault-based claim is strong enough that the expected tort award outweighs the
delays, costs, and uncertainties entailed by the tort system. If this assertion is
true even under a no-fault compensation scheme as comprehensive as New
Zealand's, it should be even more so under the more limited, targeted no-fault
schemes that the United States has adopted; after all, these schemes leave corre-
spondingly greater scope for tort remedies."
53. See Palmer, supra note 1 and accompanying text. According to the SCHEME RE-
VIEW, which was based on consultations with more than twenty "stakeholders,"
including employer organizations, a "broad conceptual support.., exists across
New Zealand for the major proposition of the scheme: entitlement to 24 hour,
comprehensive no-fault benefits in exchange for the loss of the right to sue for
damages suffered from personal injury." SCHEME REVIEW, supra note 17, at x.
54. See supra Sections II.A-B.
55. For a review of these targeted no-fault schemes, see Robert L. Rabin, The Renais-
sance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 699 (2005) and Robert L.
Rabin, The September ith Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed Response
or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2003).
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C. Causation: Therein Lies the Rub
By focusing on accident outcomes rather than on the process by which they
occurred, a no-fault scheme can reduce some of the difficulties in establishing
tort-relevant causation, but it cannot eliminate them. This truth is particularly
relevant in the area of medical treatment, where adverse outcomes often are
caused more by a patient's preexisting physical condition or bad luck than the
treatment itself. So long as society is unwilling to compensate for the former,
the causation issue will remain very difficult and costly to resolve.56 Even with
workers' compensation, which uses a very relaxed causation requirement (e.g.,
"arising in the course of employment"), causation issues abound.
D. Costs Matter-A Lot
New Zealand's experience with no-fault, especially in the medical injury
area, is studded with cost and claims increases that inevitably have produced
political reverberations and legislative reforms to the program. These conse-
quences have not been severe enough to delegitimize the program, but much
depends on the cost effects of the 2005 liberalization, which are not yet clear. It
may be, as critics of tort law maintain, that the magnitude of the costs necessary
to effectuate victim compensation is greater in the tort system than in a no-fault
system. But this economic efficiency judgment tells us nothing about the distri-
bution of costs in the two systems, which is often the more salient political issue.
The U.S. tort system tends to over-compensate relatively slight injuries and to
under-compensate more serious ones. 7 And in order to determine the distribu-
tion of costs (and benefits), one must specify the systems under comparison in
far greater detail than has been done in most debates over the systems' com-
parative merits.
58
In 2oo8, the ACC released a consultant's study with that very objective in
mind. The analysis compared costs between the New Zealand scheme and a hy-
56. For examples from no-fault systems, see SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 20, at 304-
o5 (dealing with childhood vaccines); James K. Bradley & Daniel R. Schuckers,
Toward a Unified Theory of Unemployment Compensation Eligibility for Replaced
Striking Employees, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 514-16 (2ooo) (discussing a solution to
the "causation problem"); Mark F. Grady, Better Medicine Causes More Lawsuits,
and New Administrative Courts Will Not Solve the Problem, 86 Nw. U. L. REV.
lo68, 1O8O (1992) (book review) ("The no-fault auto insurance system.saves ad-
ministrative costs by dispensing with costly joint causation problems."). See also
Kachalia et al., supra note 23, at 400-01 (citing examples from the area of medical
injuries).
57. See, e.g., Theodore F. Haas, On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation and Employ-
ers' Liability, 21 GA. L. REV. 843 (1987).
58. For a valuable effort to provide this detail, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Tort Reform
Through Damages Law Reform: An American Perspective, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 507
(2005).
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pothetical "no-ACC" scenario, which included premiums for workers' compen-
sation insurance, motor vehicle injury and other fault-based injury insurance,
and additional health expenditures and increased social transfers. The study
found that the ACC system cost NZs19 o million per year more (relative to the
no-ACC scenario), which was far less than the study's estimate of the social
value added by the ACC system, even limiting that value to those aspects that
are measurable (e.g., increased workforce participation or increased participa-
tion in potentially injurious recreation). 9
E. An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Compensation
Prevention (or deterrence, as some prefer) is a most worthy but dismay-
ingly elusive goal in all systems, whether tort or no-fault. Much depends on
how compensation is financed and on the degree of congruence between risk
creation and enhancement, on the one hand, and distribution of the costs (and
benefits) of the risky conduct, on the other.6 ° As noted earlier, the empirical
evidence documenting the effect of liability rules and compensation practices
on deterrence remains inconclusive, except perhaps at the extremes. 6' All sys-
tems, therefore, have had to adopt auxiliary measures-information, education,
administrative regulation, instinct for self-preservation, technology, market ef-
fects (including reputation), professional discipline, 6' and other behavioral in-
fluences-to augment the call for accident prevention. We know that seat belts,
Pap smears, prenatal care, and smoking cessation have large prevention payoffs,
59. SCHEME REVIEW, supra note 17, at v-x.
60. The classic exploration of this theme, of course, is GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
61. E.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS (1989);
Don Dewees & Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its Alterna-
tives: A Review of Empirical Evidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 57 (1992); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and
the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313 (1990); W. Kip
Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Ration-
ale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437
(1994).
62. Several commentators have observed that the nature of the link-tenuous in the
United States, close in New Zealand-between adverse medical outcomes and the
process for engaging and perhaps disciplining the treating physicians or institu-
tions may play a significant role in prevention. See SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note
20, at 303; Kachalia et al., supra note 23, at 400 (noting recent moves to a higher
threshold before the ACC is to report to the disciplinary bodies).
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but also that the effects of many other preventive measures (annual checkups
and child-proof drug packaging, for example) are more dubious.6"
With an eye toward reducing events that collectively account for at least
80% of deaths and serious injuries in New Zealand-motor vehicle accidents,
suicides and deliberate self-harms, workplace injuries (including occupational
diseases), assaults, falls, and drownings-the government adopted a New Zea-
land Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS) in 2003 which has initiated a number
of efforts to reduce these preventable losses. In 2005, a new alcohol-focused ini-
tiative was added. The ACC reports significant declines in these harms during
the 199os but not during the years since its establishment, so it is difficult to
separate the impact of government prevention efforts from other factors.6 4 Ac-
cording to the 2008 consultant study, NZIPS has enjoyed some success but con-
tinues to exhibit significant shortcomings.6"
F. Ignorance Is Bliss-and Arguably Remiss
These facts, and the perceived success of the New Zealand scheme, make it
all the more surprising that American lawyers are generally unaware of this in-
ternational development. The exceptions include a few comparative law and
torts scholars in the United States, such as Richard Gaskins and Stephen
Sugarman,66 who have studied and reported on it. Despite their efforts, how-
63. Compare AUDREY T. HINGLEY, PREVENTING CHILDHOOD POISONING (1997), U.S.
BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE, RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PEPPER COMMISSION (1990), Joni Hersch, Smoking,
Seat Belts, and Other Risky Consumer Decisions: Differences by Gender and Race, 17
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 471 (1996), R. Pana-Cryan & M.L. Myers, Preven-
tion Effectiveness of Rollover Protective Structures-Part III. Economic Analysis, 6 J.
AGRIC. SAFETY & HEALTH 57 (2000), and Gregory B. Rodgers, The Effectiveness of
Child-Resistant Packaging for Aspirin, 156 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT
MED. 929 (2002), with Stephen Smith, The Annual Physical Gets a Checkup, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2007, at Ci, and SAFEKIDS, CHILD RESISTANT PACKAGING
(CRP) FOR MEDICINES (2001), available at http://www.safekids.org.nz/downloads/
child%2oresistant%2opackaging.pdf (citing T.A. BLAKELY, CHILD RESISTANT
PACKAGING FOR MEDICINES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PROGRESS REPORT TO
THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH (1997)).
64. ACCIDENT COMP. CORP., PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE NEW ZEALAND INJURY
PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY 2006 TO 30 JUNE 2007: REPORT OF
THE MINISTER FOR ACC TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 2007), avail-
able at http://www.nzips.govt.nz/documents/20o8o4_Annual-report_2007.pdf.
65. SCHEME REVIEW, supra note 17, at xiii-xiv.
66. See SUGARMAN, supra note 61; Richard Gaskins, New Dynamics of Risk and Re-
sponsibility: Expanding the Vision for Accident Compensation, 35 VICT. UNIV. WEL-
LINGTON L. REV. 951 (2004). For a new and entirely normative-theoretical argu-
ment raising doubts about doing away with tort law, see Jules L. Coleman, Doing
Away with Tort Law (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale
Law & Policy Review). The leading casebooks on tort law do devote some atten-
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ever, the New Zealand scheme has had essentially zero impact on our own per-
sonal injury law (or perhaps, even more surprisingly, on the laws of Common-
wealth jurisdictions, as noted earlier). Why?
One answer could be that New Zealand is so small and remote that Ameri-
cans simply do not pay any attention to its Lilliputian institutions and practices.
There surely is some truth to the notion that what a country of just over four
million does tends to fall beneath the already cloudy American radar screen.
But there must be more to the story than that; after all, good feasible ideas are
in short enough supply that one would expect them to be seriously considered
wherever, as in the New Zealand system, they can be found. Yet the United
States has not done so.
Another part of the answer may be found in various structural differences
between the United States and New Zealand political, legal, and cultural sys-
tems. Before briefly identifying these differences, it bears emphasis that the two
countries do not differ in their commitment to the rule of law and to claims of
corrective justice. New Zealand simply has instituted what its people regard as a
far better program for protecting and compensating accident victims.6 7 Interest-
ingly, Australia and the United Kingdom, aware of the New Zealand scheme,
actively considered adopting some form of comprehensive no-fault for acci-
dents. Neither did so.
CONCLUSION
In a 1993 article, Sir Geoffrey Palmer summarized the features of New Zea-
land and U.S. tort law that might account for the far more limited use of no-
fault compensation in the United States.68 First, New Zealand common law
never developed a doctrine of strict liability for defective products; for judges to
do so, he argued, "would not be regarded as appropriate. 6 9 Second, New Zea-
land's parliamentary system, coupled with its very strict party discipline, made
it much easier for the government to adopt such far-reaching reforms. Third,
Americans "want to sue each other. It is one way of redistributing the wealth,"
tion to the New Zealand scheme. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON TORTS 1012-18 (9th ed. 2008); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN,
& MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 878-81 (8th ed. 20o6).
67. My efforts to hear from the putative opponents of the scheme, particularly the
Business Roundtable, concerning the nature of their objections have so far proved
unavailing. But see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
68. Palmer, supra note 1, at 610-12. On the point about New Zealand's parliamentary
system, see Matthew S.R. Palmer, Towards an Economics of Comparative Political
Organization: Examining Ministerial Responsibility, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 164 (1995).
For an insightful review of Palmer's earlier book, see James A. Henderson, Jr., The
New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv 781 (1981) (book review).
69. Palmer, supra note 1, at 61o.
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whereas New Zealand always exhibited far less litigiousness.7° Finally, the
United States does not embrace New Zealand's principle of community respon-
sibility, evidenced by New Zealand's adoption of old-age pensions as early as
1898.1 To Palmer's list, one might add the fact that New Zealand has a far sim-
pler, unified tax system, and (as noted earlier) relatively little first-party or em-
ployer-provided private health insurance.
Even so, I suspect a larger part of the explanation for why the New Zealand
system has aroused little interest in the United States lies in the uniqueness of
American tort law and its firm hold on the popular imagination. Proponents of
the tort system in the United States persistently argue that no-fault would increase
accident rates by encouraging risky behavior on the part of both injurers (because
their contributions to the social insurance fund are not sufficiently experience-
rated to reflect fully the costs of the risks that they create) 72 and victims (because
the fund will cover the injuries of even the careless). Sugarman and some other
experts, however, raise serious doubts about whether tort law more effectively de-
ters most negligent conduct. They argue that some combination of first-party in-
surance and safety regulation would better prevent accidents. Evidence for testing
the validity of these positions on deterrence is notoriously hard to find.73
In this domain, and in a wide array of others, the United States is exceptional,
7 4
and its politics and ideology reflect this pronounced singularity. Plainly put,
New Zealand's comprehensive social insurance approach to accident law is
simply inconceivable here.75 This realization is not based solely on the outsized
influence of the medical profession and the tort and insurance bar in the United
States, on how our lawyers are compensated, or on our greater suspicion of
government-although those are certainly factors. It is also because so many
Americans venerate the image of the Solomonic judge and jury, insist on the
common citizen's right to a day in court, and believe in tort law that levels the
playing field.76 The fact that the reality of tort law on the ground so often mocks
these ideals seems to matter much less to Americans than does their ardent wish
that the ideals were true.
70. Id. at 612.
71. Id.
72. According to the SCHEME REVIEW, the ACC should increase statistically-based
experience rating. SCHEME REVIEW, supra note 17, at xxxii-xxxiii.
73. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
74. See UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION (Pe-
ter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 20o8).
75. This view is not just my own. See AM. LAW INST., 1 REPORTER'S STUDY ON ENTER-
PRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 445 (1991).
76. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences with the 9/h Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & Soc. REV. 645 (20o8)
(studying plaintiffs' attitudes and expectations from the tort system as compared
to a non-tort compensation fund).
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